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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-3553
___________
TONY L. HAYNES,
Appellant
v.
T. MOORE, WARDEN;
MR. CROWLEY, DENTIST;
MR. WILY, DENTIST
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 09-cv-04958)
District Judge: Honorable Timothy J. Savage
____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
December 16, 2010
Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES AND NYGAARD Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 4, 2011)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
In September 2009, Tony L. Haynes, previously a prisoner of the Bucks County
Department of Corrections, filed suit pro se and in forma pauperis against T. Moore, the
prison warden of the Bucks County Correctional Facility, and two dentists at the

institution, whose names he gave as Mr. Crowley and Mr. Wily. Proceeding under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, he claimed that the dentists improperly extracted his wisdom tooth,
causing a permanent hole in his gum and severe irritation and pain. Haynes also alleged
that the dentists were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of
the Eighth Amendment when they ignored his ten subsequent requests for follow-up care
and denied him further treatment to fix the injury between February 2009 and September
2009. The basis for the claim against Moore was his perceived failure to investigate the
grievance Haynes filed in January 2009, in which he complained that he had developed a
severe irritation after the extraction of his wisdom tooth and that he continued to have
difficulties with the gum area despite visiting the dentist five times since then.
The United States Marshal’s Service tried to effect service on the dental
defendants, but reported that no one in the “medical dept.” knew of dentists by those
names. Also, an Internet search conducted by the Marshal’s Service did not reveal
dentists with those names (or with spelling variants of those names) licensed in
Pennsylvania. Moore, who did receive a copy of the complaint, responded by moving to
dismiss it. The District Court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint as to
Moore. In the memorandum accompanying the order dismissing the complaint against
Moore, the District Court also stated that the Eighth Amendment claim “appear[ed]
deficient” as to the dental defendants. The District Court noted that Haynes wrote, in the
January 2009 grievance attached to the complaint, that he had been to the dentist five
times since his wisdom tooth had been extracted.
Haynes subsequently submitted another form complaint. On the form, Haynes
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listed Moore, a dentist with the name of Crielly, and a John Doe dentist as defendants.
On the form, he outlined the problems he had with the tooth extraction and aftermath
(including what he described as a “hole” in another tooth) and explained that he had
learned the proper name of one of the dental defendants. He stated that it was Crielly
who put the hole in his gum and Crielly he wished to sue. Haynes explained that he
submitted a grievance about the matter, citing the January 2009 grievance attached to his
initial complaint. In his complaint, he also stated that it was dentists at the State
Correctional Institute at Somerset (SCI-Somerset), where he currently resides, who had to
fix his dental problem.
Moore again filed a motion to dismiss, noting that Haynes did not assert any new
claims against him in the amended complaint, and incorporating by reference his
previous arguments for dismissal as to him. The District Court, noting that Haynes had
not filed a motion to amend the complaint, treated the amended complaint as a motion to
amend the complaint and denied it. The District Court noted that Haynes wished to add
two defendants who treated him at Bucks County Prison, but concluded that the
amendment would be futile because Haynes’s claims against the defendants amounted to
claims of negligence or professional malpractice that were insufficient to state a
constitutional violation. The District Court dismissed Haynes’s action.
Haynes appeals. He has filed a motion to dismiss Moore from the appeal. In his
motion, he explains that his “case was for the dentist at Buck[s] County Jail name[d]
Dr[.] Crillcey.” Repeating the name as Dr. Crillcey, Haynes also states that another
dentist, a woman, helped Dr. Crillcey when he put a hole in Haynes’s gum. He notes that
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he went back to Dr. Crillcey approximately four times and that Dr. Crillcey hurt him and
put a hole in his gum and a hole in his tooth before the Bucks County jail sent him to
another dentist for an X-ray. He explains that it was dentists at SCI-Somerset who
provided relief from his dental problem.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We grant Haynes’s motion to
dismiss Moore from this appeal, and construe Haynes’s arguments to mean that he
appeals only from the order in which the District Court construed his amended complaint
as a motion to amend, denied it on the basis that amendment was futile, and dismissed the
action. We review an order denying leave to amend for abuse of discretion. See Grayson
v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). To the extent that the District
Court dismissed the claims against the defendants who had not been served pursuant to
its obligation to screen complaints under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, our review of the dismissal
is plenary. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).
As Haynes has admitted that he provided the wrong names for the defendants, the
District Court committed no error in dismissing the claims as to Crowley and Wily.
However, the District Court should have permitted Haynes to amend his complaint to
correct the name of one of the dentists who was initially misidentified. Rule 15 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that leave to amend should “be freely given
when justice so requires.” However, a district court may exercise its discretion and deny
leave to amend on the basis of undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, prejudice, or
futility. See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir.
1997) (citations omitted)
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The District Court cited futility as its reason for disallowing amendment, on the
basis that claims against the dental defendants amounted to claims of negligence or
professional malpractice that were insufficient to state a constitutional violation. The bar
to plead an Eighth Amendment is high – “[o]nly ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain’ or ‘deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs’ of prisoners [is] sufficiently
egregious to rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d
218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). Neither allegations of medical malpractice nor a disagreement
about a course of treatment establishes a constitutional violation. See id. However,
violations include the intentional infliction of pain on a prisoner; the denial of reasonable
requests for medical treatment where the denial exposes the prisoner to undue suffering
or the threat of tangible residual injury; and the intentional refusal to provide care in
cases where the need for medical care is known. See id. The medical condition must be
serious; and the prison officials must be deliberately indifferent to it. See id. at 236.
In this case, it is possible, based on the allegations, that Haynes had a serious
medical need. He described a hole in his gum and a hole in his tooth after a tooth
extraction that caused pain that interfered with eating and drinking, and a continuous
toothache and severe gum irritation for several months. According to him, the problem
was not fixed until he was transferred to SCI-Somerset and dentists there extracted the
tooth that had been damaged in the extraction and prescribed a course of antibiotics. It is
also possible, taking all inferences in favor of Haynes at this stage, that the Bucks County
dentist was deliberately indifferent to Haynes’s medical need. As the District Court
noted, before January 2009, Haynes had seen the dentist five times (as Haynes stated in
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the grievance attached to his complaint). However, Haynes alleged that he could not get
care for the continuing problem after January 2009. He stated that his ten requests for
needed medical care from February 2009 through September 2009 were denied with
deliberate indifference.
It is possible that Haynes will not succeed on his claim in the end. Although his
allegations state a claim, his complaint may ultimately prove to be one of disagreement
with a course of treatment, for which he would not be able to recover. Also, Haynes may
not have exhausted his administrative remedies. He alleged that he did, attaching one
grievance in which he describes an issue relating to his claims and alluding to other staff
requests. In any event, the burden would be on the defendant(s) to plead failure to
exhaust, and, if the affirmative defense were pleaded, the District Court would have to
determine the sufficiency of the exhaustion against the policy of the Bucks County
Correctional Facility (information about which is not currently before us). See Jones v.
Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 217-19 (2007).
At this stage, however, the District Court should have permitted Haynes leave to
amend because amendment does not appear to be futile (and no other factors counseling
against amendment are present). Accordingly, we will vacate the challenged order and
remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. See L.A.R. 27.4;
I.O.P. 10.6. On remand, a new summons should issue, with service of the summons and
the complaint and its amendment to be made upon the defendant Crielly or Crillcey on
the same terms as set forth in the District Court’s order of December 9, 2009. As noted
above, we grant Haynes’s motion to dismiss Moore from this appeal, and consider
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waived any challenge to the order dismissing Moore from the suit.
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